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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Does the bad check statute apply when (1) a check with a 
restrictive endorsement is offered to settle a potential claim 
against another, (2) the offer is rejected, (3) the return of the 
check is requested, (4) the money in the account to cover the 
check is used for other purposes subsequent to the rejection of 
the offer and (5) the offeree fails to return the check and then, 
many weeks later, changes his mind and deposits the check which is 
then returned for lack of funds in the account? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code, as amended, is the sole and 
determinative statute. A copy of said statute is attached in 
Appellant's Addendum, pg. i. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint alleged two causes of 
action. The first alleged a third-party beneficiary theory 
against Defendant Regency. The second alleged a violation by 
Defendant Regency of the fraudulent check statute, Section 10-15-
2 (sic) of the Utah Code. The case was tried to the bench on July 
20, 1988. After the Plaintiff rested its case the trial court 
granted a motion to dismiss the two causes of action against 
Regency. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in 
favor of Plaintiff against Defendant Bowers for the unpaid balance 
of materials supplied by Plaintiff in the principal amount of 
$5,246. This appeal is only as to the dismissal of the fraudulent 
check cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Eugene Bowers (hereinafter "Bowers") contracted 
for the construction of an apartment complex in Salt Lake County. 
(Tr. 138) 
2. Defendant Bowers hired Bowers Building and Construction 
Co. Inc., a Utah corporation, (hereinafter "Bowers Building") to 
act as the general contractor on the project. (Tr. 139) 
3. Bowers Building subcontracted the plumbing work to Horace 
Lloyd. (Tr. 141) The subcontract amount was approximately $97,000. 
(TR. 142) 
4. Horace Lloyd purchased plumbing materials from 
Plaintiff/Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply (hereinafter 
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"Plaintiff") from approximately June of 1983 to August of 1984. 
Approximately $90,000 was paid from the construction loan to 
Appellant for materials supplied to the subject project. (Tr. 143-
44) 
5. Horace Lloyd failed to pay Appellant for all of the 
materials furnished to the project. Appellant claimed that it was 
due a principal amount of approximately $19,000. The trial court 
found that only $5,246 was actually due. (R. 142) 
6. During 1984 Defendant/Respondents Regency Apartments 
Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, (hereinafter "Regency") 
negotiated with Bowers for the acquisition of the property. 
7. On December 31, 1984, the closing occurred on the 
property between Bowers and Regency. The same day the property 
was sold by Regency to Wilshire Utah I Limited Partnership. (Tr. 
84) 
8. Wilshire failed to make the required payments to the 
first mortgage holder, American Savings and Loan, as well as to 
Bowers and Regency. Wilshire has since filed for protection under 
the bankruptcy laws. American Savings thereafter foreclosed on 
the property. (R. 84) 
9. After the receipt of a payment from Wilshire in April of 
1985 Jeffrey Bernson, a representative of Regency, contacted 
several entities claiming money from Bowers and/or Bowers Building 
for work performed on the project. Mr. Bernson attempted to 
negotiate a settlement with the creditors. To the extent the 
entities were willing to accept an amount less than the amount 
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claimed, Regency would then obtain a credit against the sums owed 
by Regency to Bowers. (Tr. 97-98) All of the creditors, except 
Plaintiff, negotiated a settlement. (Tr. 96) 
10. Plaintiff was presented a check dated May 15, 1985 drawn 
on the account of Regency in the amount of $13,750. A copy of the 
check is found in the record at page 102. The check contained a 
restrictive endorsement which indicated that Plaintiff, by 
endorsing the check, would be releasing any and all claims it 
might have against Bowers and/or the property. (Tr. 104) The 
$13,750 figure was an arbitrary offer to settle a claim by 
Plaintiff of approximately $19,000. (Tr. 96, R. 102) 
11. After receipt of the check Don Peterson, the president 
of Plaintiff, telephoned both Mr. Bernson and Mr. Babcock, both 
partners in Regency, in two separate telephone calls, and informed 
them that Plaintiff was unwilling to accept the amount offered by 
means of the check. Mr. Peterson asked for more money but was 
told that it was a take it or leave it offer. (Tr. 17-18, 74, 109) 
12. Mr. Bernson asked Mr. Peterson to return the check. (Tr. 
109) 
13. Mr. Peterson failed to return the check but rather 
posted it on a mirror in his office where he could look at it 
every day. (Tr. 18) 
14. Approximately six weeks later Mr. Peterson changed his 
mind and decided to accept the check and therefore deposited the 
check. (Tr. 18) 
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15. The funds available to cover the check in the 
eventuality that the offer was accepted were then used for other 
partnership purposes by Regency. The check therefore did not 
clear when it was eventually presented to the bank for payment 
some six weeks after it was requested to be returned. (Tr. 109-
110) 
16. The trial court found that Regency never received 
anything of value from Plaintiff in exchange for the check. (Tr. 
129) Plaintiff had supplied the materials many months before the 
check was offered by Regency. (Tr. 129) Any mechanic lien rights 
had long since lapsed. 
17. The trial court also found that the check was given in 
an effort to settle a claim, that Mr. Peterson chose not to accept 
the offer, that Mr. Peterson was asked to return the check but did 
not do so but deposited it many weeks later. (Tr. 129) 
18. The trial court entered judgment against Bowers on a 
theory of quantum meruit since he was the owner of the project at 
the time the materials were supplied by Plaintiff. (Tr. 157-58) 
Judgment was entered for the unpaid balance of materials supplied 
in the sum of $5,246. (Tr. 157, R. 142) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly applied the law interpreting the 
fraudulent check statute to the facts found by the trial court. 
The fraudulent check statute does not apply to a check offered as 
a settlement of a claim against another which offer is rejected 
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and then, several weeks later, the offeree changes his mind and 
deposits the check. Further, the subject statute does not apply 
since the check was not given for the purpose of obtaining from 
Plaintiff anything of value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FRAUDULENT CHECK STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. RATHER THE BASIC COMMON 
LAW DOCTRINES OF CONTRACT FORMATION CONTROL. 
The trial court held, in ruling from the bench on Regency's 
motion to dismiss, that the check was offered by Regency to 
Plaintiff to settle a claim which Mr. Peterson, exercising his own 
judgment chose not to accept. The court further held that the 
check was asked to be returned but in fact was deposited many 
weeks later. (Tr. 129-30) The court then concluded that it was not 
persuaded that the statutory language had been met in creating 
this cause of action. (Tr. 130) 
The fraudulent check statute requires that a check be given 
"for the purpose of obtaining from any person...any money, 
merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any 
service, wages, salary, or rent....11 The trial court found, as 
stated above, that the check was not given for the purpose of 
obtaining something of value from the Plaintiff but rather was 
offered to settle a claim Plaintiff had against another party. 
Instead of giving up something of value the court found that 
Plaintiff chose not to accept the offer. The offer was then 
withdrawn as the check was asked to be returned to Regency. Many 
6 
weeks later Plaintiff attempted to accept the previously withdrawn 
offer by depositing the check. It is basic common law that an 
offer that is withdrawn cannot be accepted. 
The check sent by Regency to Plaintiff was an offer to enter 
into an accord and satisfaction. The offer was found by the court 
to have been rejected. It was then withdrawn. Plaintiff belatedly 
and unilaterally attempted to seize the previously proposed 
"satisfaction" portion of the proposed accord and satisfaction by 
depositing the check approximately six weeks later. 
The proverbial ever clear hindsight suggests that Regency 
could have avoided this entire cause of action if it had stopped 
payment on the check after Mr. Peterson chose not to accept the 
check and Mr. Bernson asked Mr. Peterson to return it. If payment 
had been stopped on the check it would not have been returned for 
insufficient funds. Under those circumstances the fraudulent 
check statute would clearly not have applied. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT REGENCY 
OBTAINED NOTHING OF VALUE FROM PLAINTIFF BY GIVING 
PLAINTIFF THE SUBJECT CHECK. 
As stated above the fraudulent check statute requires that a 
check be given for the purpose of obtaining something of value. 
The trial court specifically found that the nothing of value had 
been obtained by Regency from Plaintiff in exchange for the 
presentment of the subject check. (Tr. 130) This finding by the 
trial court properly gave further support to the court's dismissal 
of the fraudulent check cause of action. 
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Plaintiff contends that it gave up something of value. A 
careful analysis of that contention demonstrates that Plaintiff 
gave up nothing of value in exchange for the check offered by 
Regency. The trial court specifically found that the material 
supplied by Plaintiff to the Project had been supplied months 
earlier for and on behalf and at the request of parties other than 
Regency. (Tr.129) Therefore, no goods were obtained from 
Plaintiff in exchange for the subject check. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff was not induced to give up anything in exchange for the 
check. See HowellTs, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, (Utah, 1977). 
Plaintiff asserts that the check was given for "value" to 
release a potential lien. Such an argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Plaintiff clearly had no mechanic lien rights in May of 
1985 when the check was presented when the last materials were 
supplied by the Plaintiff to the Project in August of 1984. 
Plaintiff, as a lower tiered supplier, had to file its lien within 
80 days of supplying its last materials. Since the check was 
presented some seven months after the last materials were supplied 
by Plaintiff and more than four months after the property had been 
sold by Bowers to Regency and then to Wilshire Plaintiff had 
absolutely no mechanic lien rights to give up. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Plaintiff did have 
mechanic lien rights at the time it was offered the check this 
argument would nonetheless also fail because Plaintiff chose not 
to accept the check and therefore retained any and all mechanic 
lien rights it had. The fraudulent check statute clearly 
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contemplates, the trial court stated, an exchange (presumably of 
contemporaneous nature) of a check for an item of value. (Tr. 129) 
Since Plaintiff chose not to accept the check it certainly cannot 
be held to have given up anything of value. 
Plaintiff also contends that the check was given for "value" 
to purchase credit towards the contract between Regency and 
Bowers. For reasons similar to those relating to the mechanic 
lien argument this contention also fails. While Regency had hoped 
to obtain a credit towards its contract with Bowers if Plaintiff 
had timely accepted its offered check in fact Regency never did 
obtain such credit. The obvious reason the credit was not 
obtained is that Plaintiff chose not to accept the offered check. 
Further, since Plaintiff's claims against Bowers were not 
satisfied as evidenced by the judgment against Bowers in favor of 
Plaintiff in the principal amount of $5,246. Plaintiff retained 
everything of value it had both before and after it was offered 
the check. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code definition of "for value" as it relates to the definition of 
a "holder in due course" should be a basis for interpreting the 
fraudulent check statute. Plaintiff asserts that the UCC 
definition of "for value" applies in that the offered check was 
given in payment for an antecedent debt. This argument also fails 
for reasons similar to those given in response to the prior two 
arguments. While the check was offered to settle a claim that 
Plaintiff had against Bowers, Plaintiff chose not to accept the 
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check because it was for less than what Plaintiff claimed was 
actually due and owing. Since the antecedent debt alleged in this 
matter was, in fact, the debt of Bowers, there is no consideration 
for the check. See Labrum v., Hansen, 665 P. 2d 1325, (Utah 1983) 
and Matter of Voightfs Estate, 624 P.2d 1022, (NM App. 1980). As 
mentioned above, Plaintiff retained all claims it had against 
Bowers said claims being unaffected by either the offered check or 
the rejection of said check. Plaintiff did not release or waive 
or forgive the alleged antecedent debt but rather pursued the 
antecedent debt of Bowers to judgment. 
It should be noted that the argument relating to the UCC 
definition of "for value" is objectionable on other grounds as 
well. Plaintiff does not, and properly so, claim that it is a 
holder in due course. It can not do so since it cannot claim that 
it took the instrument without notice of a defense against the 
cashing of the check some six weeks after being told to return the 
check to Regency. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE FRAUDULENT CHECK STATUTE SHOULD BE 
NARROWLY AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE 
SURROUNDING FACTS. 
Plaintiff asserted at the trial court level that Regency 
should be liable under the fraudulent check statute under a strict 
liability standard. Plaintiff asserted that "if a check has been 
dishonored and if notice is properly given for which there is no 
satisfaction, the maker of the check is strictly liable." (R. 112) 
Plaintiff apparently is making the same argument on appeal when it 
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argues that Section 7-15-1 is meaningless if the same burden of 
proof is imposed as is imposed under the criminal bad check 
statute, Section 76-6-505. 
It does not appear to Regency that the trial court imposed 
the same burden of proof in the instant case as would be imposed 
in a criminal case. Besides the obvious beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard versus a preponderance of the evidence standard the 
criminal bad check provision requires proof that the person who 
issues the check does so knowing that it will not be paid by the 
drawee. If Plaintiff is asserting that the trial court rejected 
Plaintiff's claim for failing to meet that same burden such an 
assertion would be erroneous. Nowhere in the court's ruling was 
that standard discussed. (It should be noted parenthetically that 
Plaintiff has never challenged Regency's position that there were 
sufficient funds to cover the subject check in the account at the 
time the check was offered and until the Plaintiff chose not to 
accept the check at which time the funds were used for other 
partnership purposes.) There is no question that Regency would 
have no problem establishing its innocence to a charge that the 
check was issued knowing it would not be honored by the drawee. 
The standard adopted by the trial court was that Plaintiff 
had the burden to show that the check was given for value. 
Further, the court was not adopting a strict liability standard 
that the maker would be liable for a fraudulent check if a check 
was dishonored for lack of funds regardless of the reason. The 
court appropriately considered the surrounding circumstances. If 
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a strict liability was in fact the standard, the statute would 
simply state that the maker of any check that bounces is liable-
period. The statute, however, already says more than that. 
Strict liability is not the standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of the fraudulent check cause of 
action against Regency should be upheld. Plaintiff rejected the 
offer of Regency and gave nothing of value to Regency nor gave up 
anything of value in exchange for the check. Plaintiff refused to 
give up its claims against Bowers which Plaintiff alleged exceeded 
$19,000. Plaintiff rejected Regency's offer of $13,750. When put 
to the proof of its claim Plaintiff established a claim of only 
$5,246. Now Plaintiff pursues an appeal continuing to assert a 
claim for more than double what it could prove was actually due it 
for materials supplied to the Project solely on a strict liability 
interpretation of Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code. The appeal 
ought to be soundly rejected. 
Respectfully submitted this <J day of April, 1989. 
Walstad and Babcock, P.C. 
Steven Crawley, Ai^^rney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
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